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Abstract
In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service
using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure
capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat
of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated
incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the
entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the net-
work input more efficiently. We show that the incumbent lowers the access
price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient
bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of
view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the
option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of
access might be profitable for consumers and welfare because competition is
fiercer under bypass.
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1 Introduction
In liberalized network industries, competitors of the historical operator have
the choice between two modes of competition: service-based and facility-
based competition. In the former case, competing firms offer retail products
and services using the incumbent’s installed infrastructure for which they
pay an access fee (the ’buy’ or the ’access’ option). In the latter case, firms
develop their own infrastructure to compete on the retail market (the ’make’
or the ’bypass’ option). This can be illustrated by the broadband service
market where the two modes of competition coexist. In the countries where
access to the incumbent’s DSL network is mandatory, rival firms can supply
services on the incumbent’s network. Alternatively, firm can develop their
own platform (cable TV network, wireless) to provide broadband services
to consumers.
In this paper, we revisit the issue of make-or-buy by analyzing the strate-
gic use of the access price in order to deter bypass by the incoming firm.
By analogy with the literature on entry deterrence (Tirole, 1988) we iden-
tify three re´gimes: accommodated bypass, prevented bypass and blocked
bypass.1 We show that the incumbent accommodates bypass only if the
entrant is more cost effective. Hence, even when the incumbent strategi-
cally sets the access charge to deter bypass, the make-or-buy decision of the
entrant is technologically efficient. However, the limit access price chosen
to deter bypass is inefficiently high resulting in higher retail prices despite
lower production costs. Hence, in the parameter region where bypass is
prevented, the regulator may prefer to restrict access in order to enhance
competition between the two providers. Furthermore, any local change in
the access price raises consumer surplus, either because it induces a change
in the make-or-buy decision of the entrant or because it reduces the access
price.
In order to understand our results, notice that the intensity of retail
price competition depends on the technological choice made by the entrant.
If the entrant buys access to the existing infrastructure, the incumbent has
an opportunity cost of decreasing its retail price corresponding to the lost
income on the access product (Sappington, 2005). Hence, the aggressiveness
of the incumbent at the price setting stage is inversely related to the price
cost margin on the access product. The choice of a technology, access or
bypass, by the entrant is not only driven by the relative cost of the two
technologies but also by the intensity of competition on the retail market.
1Bloch and Gautier (2008) made the same distinction for a fully-regulated market.
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To deter bypass, the incumbent must set an access price at a level that
guarantee a higher profit for the entrant when it chooses service-based com-
petition compared to infrastructure-based competition. This requires lower-
ing the access price below the ex-post efficient level. But a lower access price
increases the firms’ aggressiveness at the price competition stage. Indeed,
the entrant has a lower production cost (the access price) and the incum-
bent has a lower opportunity cost making price competition fiercer. In this
paper, we demonstrate that when the entrant is more cost effective than the
incumbent, the bypass deterrence strategy requires selling access at losses
which intensifies retail price competition and lead to lower profits than the
bypass option. For that reason, the incumbent does not find profitable to
deter bypass when its competitor is more efficient. Conversely, when the
entrant is less cost effective, bypass can be prevented with an access price
above the entrant’s cost and retail price competition is thus soften. We thus
have a paradoxical situation: Under the threat of bypass, an unregulated
access price induces an efficient make-or-buy choice by the entrant but it
leads to higher retail prices for the consumers.
For that reason, there is still room for market regulation. Indeed, policies
that aim at promoting mandatory access to the incumbent’s infrastructure
might not be the most appropriate, particularly when a possibility of by-
pass exists. The bypass deterrence strategy benefits to the firms at the
expense of the consumers. Restricting the possibilities of access may be wel-
fare improving even if it increases the production costs. Mandatory access
has been criticized on the grounds that it deters investment in alternative
infrastructures.2 In this paper, we show that price competition is fiercer
under inter-platform competition compared to service-based competition.
Mandatory access may thus be detrimental both in the short-run (higher
retail prices) and the long-run (lower investments).
We now situate our contribution with respect to the existing literature.
The question of efficient make-or-buy decision has received a lot of atten-
tion both from a static and a dynamic point of view. In dynamic mod-
els, facility-based competition is often considered as a long-term objective.
The question then is to know whether allowing for service-based competi-
tion accelerates the development of facility based competition (the so-called
2In an international study using a sample of OECD countries, Bouckaert et. al (2010)
found that a more important market share of service-based competitors on the DSL plat-
forms is associated with lower rates of broadband penetration. Accordingly, mandatory
access to the incumbent DSL networks negatively affect the incentives to invest in alter-
native broadband networks. See also Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a detailed survey on
this issue.
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step-stone effect identified by Cave and Vogelsang, 2003) or delays the in-
stallation of new infrastructure (Bourreau and Dog˜an, 2005). For Cave and
Vogelsang (2003), service-based competition allows new comers in the in-
dustry to invest progressively in their own infrastructure, first in replicable
assets (e.g. long-distance conveyance facility) then in less replicable ones
(e.g. local loop). When there are ladders of investment, leasing part of the
existing infrastructure is then essential for the development of facility-based
competition. Accordingly, a low access price accelerates the deployment of
alternative infrastructures.3 For Bourreau and Dog˜an (2005), allowing for
access delays investment in competing infrastructures because the cost of a
new infrastructure includes an opportunity cost equals to the profit realized
under service-based competition (an effect that is similar to the replacement
effect in innovation races). Following that, a lower access price increases the
opportunity cost of bypass and should delay further infrastructure building.
In a static setting, Sappington (2005) demonstrates the irrelevance of
the access price for the choice between service- and facility-based compe-
tition and he shows that the most efficient mode of competition always
emerges in an unregulated market. The entrant develops its own infras-
tructure only if it can provide the network input more efficiently than the
incumbent. Sappington’s argument is constructed using an Hoteling model
with a fully-covered market. Gayle and Weisman (2007) demonstrate that,
in more general setting, the access price matters for the choice of a mode
of competition. Thereby, setting the access price appropriately is of prime
importance to induce efficient technological choices. Mandy (2009) iden-
tifies a set of access prices that induce productive efficiency among which
he recommends pricing access at the entrant’s marginal cost. With such a
price, the entrant bypass the incumbent’s network only when it is more cost
effective.
Our work is directly connected to the three above mentioned paper. We
consider, as in Gayle and Weisman (2007), models where the access price
is relevant for the choice between access and bypass, namely price compe-
tition with differentiated products.4 In these set-ups, we analyze, as Sap-
pington (2005) the question of productive efficiency or, differently, whether
the access prices identified by Mandy (2009) emerge from an unregulated
market scenario and we conclude that productive efficiency is achieved for
non-regulated access prices.
3For Avenali et al., (2009), the access charge should rise over time. Early service-
based entry is then profitable and the competitors have the time and the incentives to
progressively switch to facility-based competition.
4Our results can be extended to the Cournot competition case.
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model
in Section 2, and discuss our basic analysis of strategic bypass deterrence in
Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to an illustrative linear example, and Section
5 to robustness checks and extensions of the model. We give conclusions
and directions for future research in Section 6.
2 The model
We consider a model of price competition between two firms: a vertically
integrated incumbent, firm 1, and a competitor, firm 2. To produce for the
retail market, firms need a network input. Firm 1 has an installed network
and it can produce one unit of network input at unit cost c1. Firm 2 has
no installed network. To produce, it has two options: access or bypass. The
entrant either buys access to the the firm 1’s network at unit price w or it
installs its own network infrastructure and produces the network input at
unit cost c2. The quality of the good produced by firm 2 is independent
of the technology chosen to produce it. We assume that all other costs are
normalized to zero. Results would not be changed if the incumbent has to
support a fixed network cost f1, as it would be sunk anyway and we will
consider in section 5, the case in which installing the network involves a
fixed cost f2 for the entrant.
In the retail market, the demand for product supplied by firm i = 1, 2
at prices (pi, pj) is given by xi(pi, pj). Products are differentiated, and the
products are substitutes so that the demand functions satisfy the natural
conditions: ∂xi∂pi < 0,
∂xi
∂pj
> 0 and there exists p such that xi(pi, pj) = 0 for
all pj and all pi > p. In addition, we will assume that firms never choose to
set a price pi > p, and that the access charge w is bounded above by p.
When firm 2 chooses the access option, the incumbent sells two products:
the retail good 1 at price p1 and access to its network at price w. Both goods
are produced at unit cost c1 and the firms’ profits in the access regime are
given by:
pia1(p1, p2, w) = (p1 − c1)x1(p1, p2) + (w − c1)x2(p1, p2), (1)
pia2(p1, p2, w) = (p2 − w)x2(p1, p2). (2)
When firm 2 chooses the bypass option, each firm sells a single product
and the profits are:
pib1(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)x1(p1, p2), (3)
pib2(p1, p2) = (p2 − c2)x2(p1, p2). (4)
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We make the following assumptions on the parameters of the model.
Assumption 1 The demand functions, access and bypass profit functions
satisfy the following conditions:
∂2piai
∂p2i
< − ∂
2piai
∂pi∂pj
< 0,
∂2pibi
∂p2i
< − ∂
2pibi
∂pi∂pj
< 0,
and
−(∂x2
∂p1
)2
∂2pia1
∂p21
−∂x2
∂p1
∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
+
∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p21
∂2pia2
∂p22
−∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
∂2pia2
∂p1∂p2
< 0.
The first part of Assumption 1 guarantees that profit functions are con-
cave in prices, that best response functions are increasing, and that the
slopes of the best response functions are everywhere smaller than one. These
assumptions are needed to prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
prices. The second part Assumption 1 is needed to verify that the profit
of the entrant is always decreasing in the access price w. While this As-
sumption corresponds to the ”natural” case, it need not always be satisfied
and only holds when the direct effect on prices, as measured by the sec-
ond derivative −∂2pia1
∂p21
is sufficiently high with respect to the indirect effect
measured by the cross derivative ∂
2pia2
∂p1∂p2
.5
We finally describe the timing of the model. As in classical models of en-
try deterrence, we suppose that the incumbent commits to the access price
w first, in order to influence the decision of the entrant. After observing
the access price w, the entrant chooses between infrastructure-based com-
petition (bypass) and service-based competition (access) as in the standard
framework (Sappington, 2005; Gayle and Weisman, 2007; Mandy, 2009).
Finally, firms simultaneously choose retail prices p1 and p2.
3 Strategic bypass deterrence
We solve the game by backward induction and first analyze the equilibrium
of the game where the two firms choose their retail prices.
5In the linear model analyzed in Section 4, this condition will hold if the displacement
ratio is smaller than one.
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3.1 Price competition under access
Suppose that the entrant has chosen to buy access at price w. Given As-
sumption 1, at the price competition stage, firms’ optimal behavior is char-
acterized by the first order conditions:
x1(p1, p2) +
∂x1
∂p1
(p1 − c1) + ∂x2
∂p1
(w − c1) = 0, (5)
x2(p1, p2) +
∂x2
∂p2
(p2 − w) = 0. (6)
Let (pˆa1, pˆ
a
2) denote the solutions to these first order conditions and pˆi
a
1 , pˆi
a
2
the profits of the two firms at prices (pˆa1, pˆ
a
2).
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The pricing game admits
a unique equilibrium (pˆa1, pˆ
a
2). Furthermore, at equilibrium,
∂pˆa1
∂w > 0,
∂pˆa2
∂w > 0
and ∂pˆi
a
2
∂w < 0.
Proposition 1 establishes that in equilibrium, the prices charged by both
firms are increasing in the access charge. This results rests on a simple
intuition: as the access charge increases, the cost of the entrant increases
raising its price. Simultaneously, the share of the access revenue in the
profit of the incumbent increases, resulting in softer competition between
the firms, and leading the incumbent to raise its price. Furthermore, under
Assumption 1, we also show that the direct effect of an increase in access
charges on the profit of the entrant outweighs the strategic effect due to
an increase in equilibrium prices, so that the ”natural” comparative statics
result holds and pˆia2 is decreasing in w.
The effect of an increase in w on the profit of the incumbent is more
complex to ascertain. On the one hand, an increase in w, by increasing
both prices, raises the profit that the incumbent makes on its retail product,
(p1 − c1)x1. On the other hand, an increase in w may reduce the demand
for access, resulting in a decrease in the access revenue of the incumbent.6
Overall, while we cannot sign the effect of an increase in w on pˆia1 , we can
provide a sufficient condition under which the profit of the incumbent is
concave in the access charge w.
6In the particular case of Hotelling competition with fully covered market studied by
Sappington (2005), the two effects exactly cancel each other, so that the equilibrium profit
of the entrant is independent of w. However, this is a special case and does not hold for
general models of price competition.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that
∂p2
∂w
[
∂2pia1
∂p2∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p22
∂p2
∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p2∂p1
∂p1
∂w
]
+
∂2p2
∂w2
∂pia1
∂p2
+
∂x2
∂p1
∂p1
∂w
+
∂x2
∂p2
∂p2
∂w
< 0.
Then the profit of the incumbent, pˆia1 is a concave function of w. Further-
more,
w∗ = argmax
w
pˆia1 > c1.
Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition for the concavity of the incum-
bent’s profit in the access charge, and shows that the optimal access charge
is always higher than the marginal cost c1. Notice that we do not rule out
the fact that the profit of the incumbent is continuously increasing in the
access charge, so that the optimal level is the corner solution w∗ = p. Un-
fortunately, the sufficient condition of Lemma 1 cannot be written easily in
terms of the primitive demand functions x1 and x2. The condition will be
satisfied when the price of the entrant is a concave function of w. However,
the relation between p2 and w cannot be too concave, as (∂p2∂w +w
∂2p2
∂w2
> 0).
The condition also requires that the own effect of a change in prices on the
demand of the incumbent ∂x2∂p2 be sufficiently higher than the cross effect
∂x2
∂p1
so that (1 − ∂p2∂w )∂x2∂p2 + (1 −
∂p1
∂w )
∂x2
∂p1
< 0. In Section 4, we compute the ex-
act restrictions on parameters needed to guarantee that the condition holds
when demand functions are linear.
3.2 Price competition under bypass
Suppose that the entrant has chosen to build its own infrastructure. The
equilibrium prices are now characterized by the first order conditions:
x1(p1, p2) +
∂x1
∂p1
(p1 − c1) = 0, (7)
x2(p1, p2) +
∂x2
∂p2
(p2 − c2) = 0. (8)
Denoting the solution to the first order conditions by (pˆb1, pˆ
b
2) with cor-
responding profits pˆib1 and pˆi
b
2, we show:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The pricing game admits
a unique equilibrium (pˆb1, pˆ
b
2). Furthermore, at equilibrium,
∂pˆb1
∂c1
> 0, ∂pˆ
b
2
∂c2
> 0
and ∂pˆi
b
2
∂c2
< 0.
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Proposition 2 shows that, under Assumption 1, we obtain the well-known
comparative statics effects of marginal costs on equilibrium prices and prof-
its: an increase in the marginal cost of firm i results in an increase in equi-
librium prices and a decrease in the equilibrium profit of firm i.
3.3 Access vs. bypass
We now analyze the entrant’s choice between bypass and access. The en-
trant’s ’make-or-buy’ decision depends on the comparison between the prof-
its pˆia2(w) and pˆi
b
2. As pˆi
a
2(w) is strictly decreasing in the access charge, we can
compute the threshold value of the access price w˜ which makes the entrant
indifferent between access and bypass:
pˆia2(w˜) = pˆi
b
2(c2). (9)
By a slight abuse of notations, denote pˆia2(x) and pˆi
b
2(x) the equilibrium
profit of the entrant as a function of the input cost of the entrant (respec-
tively w and c2) in the access and bypass regimes, and pˆia1(x) and pˆi
b
1(x)
the equilibrium profit of the incumbent as a function of the input cost of
the entrant in the access and bypass regimes. By Assumption 1, the direct
effect of an increase in cost outweighs the strategic effect, so that pˆia2(x) and
pˆib2(x) are both decreasing functions. Hence, equation (9) characterizes a
unique access charge w˜ which makes the entrant indifferent between making
or buying (as long as pˆia2(0) > pˆi
b
2(c2)) and by the Implicit Function The-
orem, the threshold access charge w˜ is increasing in the marginal cost c2.
In addition, we obtain the following comparison of profits in the access and
bypass re´gimes.
Lemma 2 For any x < w∗. If x < c1, pˆib2(x) > pˆia2(x) and pˆib1(x) > pˆia1(x).
If x > c1, pˆib2(x) < pˆi
a
2(x) and pˆi
b
1(x) < pˆi
a
1(x). If x = c1, pˆi
b
2(x) = pˆi
a
2(x) and
pˆib1(x) = pˆi
a
1(x).
Lemma 2 is a fundamental result, which drives the analysis of the model
of strategic bypass deterrence. It shows that the incumbent and entrant rank
the two re´gimes of access and bypass in the same way. They both prefer
bypass to access when the input cost of the entrant is greater than c1, and
they both prefer access to bypass when the input cost of the entrant is lower
than c1. In order to grasp intuition about Lemma 2, recall that the difference
between access and bypass re´gimes is that in access, the incumbent provides
two goods: the final retail good at price p1 and access to the network at
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price w. If w < c1, the incumbent loses money on access (the opportunity
cost of access is negative), and has an incentive to price aggressively in
order to reduce demand for good 2. Hence, under access, the entrant faces
high access charges and low demand, whereas the incumbent makes losses
on access and prices aggressively; both the entrant and incumbent prefer
bypass to access. On the other hand, when w∗ > w > c1, the incumbent
makes profit on access, and increases prices to soften competition. Hence,
under access, the entrant faces higher prices and lower charges, whereas the
incumbent makes profit on access and chooses high prices; both the entrant
and incumbent prefer access to bypass.
Given Lemma 2 and equation (9), if c2 < c1, w˜(c2) < c2, and if c2 > c1,
w˜(c2) > c2. If the cost of the entrant is lower than the cost of the incumbent,
the incumbent needs to reduce her access charge below c2 in order to induce
access. By contrast, if the cost of the entrant is higher than the cost of the
incumbent, the incumbent can induce access with an access charge above c2.
Figure 1 illustrates this observation, by displaying the profit of the entrant
under bypass and access as a function of the entrant’s cost x. It shows
the limit access charge w˜ for two values of the entrant’s cost, c2 < c1 and
c′2 > c1.
-
6
x
pi2
Access
Bypass
c1w(c2) c2 w(c′2) c′2
Figure 1: Entrant’s profit under bypass and access
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Turning to the incumbent’s profit, Figure 2 shows the profit under bypass
and access for different values of the entrant’s input cost, x. Notice that,
by Lemma 1, the optimal access charge w∗ satisfies w∗ ≥ c1. Hence, the
optimal re´gimes for the incumbent are (i) to choose bypass whenever x < c1,
and access whenever x > c1.
-
6
x
pi1
Access
Bypass
c1 w
∗
Figure 2: Incumbent’s profit under bypass and access
3.4 Optimal choice of the access charge
We now consider the optimal choice of the access charge by the incumbent.
First note that the incumbent will never choose an access charge w > w∗ if
the entrant chooses access. We thus restrict attention to access charges in
[0, w∗].
We first consider a situation where the entrant is more efficient than
the incumbent, c2 < c1. By the observation underlying Figure 1, whenever
c2 < c1, the limit access charge satisfies w˜(c2) < c2. Hence, in order to
deter bypass, the incumbent has to choose a low access price w˜(c2) < c2.
As c2 < c1, pib1(c2) > pi
a
1(c2) > pi
a
1(w˜(c2)), so the incumbent prefers to allow
bypass at cost c2 than to promote access.
Next, consider the case where the incumbent is more efficient than the
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entrant, c2 > c1, so that the limit access charge satisfies w˜(c2) > c2. We
distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that w˜(c2) < w∗. As c2 > c1,
pia1(w˜(c2)) > pi
a
1(c2) > pi
b
1(c2). Hence, the incumbent optimally chooses
to charge the limit access price w˜(c2) in order to deter bypass. Second,
suppose that w˜(c2) ≥ w∗. Then, by setting the optimal access charge w∗,
the incumbent deters bypass. As pia1(w
∗) > pia1(c2) > pib1(c2), the optimal
strategy of the incumbent is to select the optimal access charge w∗ and to
deter bypass. We summarize the discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The incumbent sets the access charge w as follows. if c2 <
c1, bypass occurs. If c1 ≤ c2 < w˜−1(w∗), the incumbent sets the limit access
charge w˜(c2) to deter bypass. If c2 ≥ w˜−1(w∗), the incumbent sets the
optimal access charge w∗ and deters bypass.
Proposition 3 characterizes the limit pricing behavior of the incumbent
in a model of access and bypass. By analogy with a model of strategic entry
deterrence, we characterize three re´gimes. When the cost of the entrant is
low (c2 < c1), the incumbent prefers to accommodate bypass. When the
cost of the entrant is intermediate (c1 ≤ c2 < w˜−1(w∗)), the incumbent
chooses to prevent bypass by setting a limit access charge w˜(c2). Finally,
when the cost of the entrant is large (c2 ≥ w˜−1(w∗)), bypass is blocked at
the optimal access charge w∗ so that the incumbent does not need to distort
his pricing strategy to deter bypass. We remark that the optimal behavior of
the incumbent always induces a technologically efficient choice: the entrant
chooses bypass whenever c2 < c1 and access whenever c2 > c1.7
3.5 Welfare and regulation
In order to assess the welfare implications of the equilibrium of the game
played by the incumbent and the entrant, we suppose that demand functions
are generated by a competitive market with a mass one of consumers with
a representative quasi-linear utility function
U = U(x1, x2)− p1x1 − p2x2.
To conduct the analysis, we make the following Assumptions on the utility
function:
7This is also reflected in the analysis of Mandy (2009) who did not endogenize the
choice of access charges. The endogenous access charge in our model lies in the set of
efficient access prices identified by Mandy (2009).
12
Assumption 2 We suppose that U(x1, x2) is increasing and concave, that
both goods are normal goods and that the following conditions are satisfied:
x1 ≥ −
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
∂U
∂x2
∂2U
∂x21
∂2U
∂x22
− ∂2U∂x1∂x2
,
x2 ≥ −
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
∂U
∂x1
∂2U
∂x21
∂2U
∂x22
− ∂2U∂x1∂x2
.
Because the utility function is quasi-linear in income, the Marshallian con-
sumer surplus is a well-defined welfare measure. Assumption 2 guarantees
that any increase in prices will harm consumers, and will be needed to com-
pare consumer welfare under access and bypass re´gimes. Total welfare is
defined by:
W = (1− λ)U + λ(pi1 + pi2),
= (1− λ)(U(x1, x2)− p1x1 − p2x2)
+ λ((p1 − c1)x1(p1, p2) + (p2 − θ)x2(p1, p2)),
where λ is the share of firms in total welfare, θ = c1 in the case of access and
θ = c2 in the case of bypass. Let Ua(x) and U b(x) denote the consumer’s
utility under access and bypass when the access charge is x. As prices are
increasing in the access charge by Proposition 2, and consumer surplus is
decreasing in prices, there exists a unique value of the entrant’s cost, c2,
such that
Ua(w∗) = U b(c2).
Comparing welfare under access and bypass, we find that consumers and
firms have opposite preferences over the two re´gimes when c2 < c2:
Proposition 4 If c2 < c1, Ua(w˜(c2)) > U b(c2) and if c2 > c2 > c1,
U b(c2) > Ua(minw∗, w˜(c2)) and if c2 > c2, Ua(w∗) > U b(c2). Furthermore,
c2 > w
∗.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is easy to grasp: while firms benefit
from higher prices, consumers are harmed by re´gimes under which prices
are higher and competition softer. When the entrant is more efficient than
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the incumbent, consumers would prefer the incumbent to impose access at
a price w˜(c2) < c1 at which she makes losses on access, resulting in low
prices and strong competition. When the incumbent is more efficient than
the entrant and c2 < c2, the consumers prefer to encourage bypass, because
competition between the two firms is fiercer and prices are lower. When
c2 > c2, bypass becomes too expensive, and prices are lower at access when
the incumbent charges his optimal access charge w∗.
Proposition 4 thus shows the existence of a fundamental tension between
consumer surplus and firms’ profits, which make it impossible to clearly as-
sess the re´gime which maximizes total welfare W when c2 < c2. In addition,
we note that there exists a tension between production efficiency which spec-
ifies that access should be chosen when c1 < c2 and bypass should be chosen
when c2 < c1 and economic efficiency which specifies that prices should be
as low as possible to maximize total surplus. In particular, note that when
c1 < c2 < c2, access is technologically efficient, but results in higher retail
prices than bypass. This is due to the fact that the limit access charge w˜(c2)
is always higher than the marginal cost c2 of the entrant when c2 > c1. We
thus obtain the seemingly paradoxical result that in equilibrium firms choose
the re´gime with the lowest production costs and the highest retail prices.
3.5.1 Access regulation
We first consider a situation where the regulator cannot choose the access
price, but can impose the access or bypass re´gime. Suppose that the wel-
fare function of the regulator coincides with consumer surplus. If c2 < c1,
the regulator would like to prevent bypass and impose access, forcing the
incumbent into losses.8 If c2 > c2, the incentives of consumers and firms
are aligned, and access is optimal. If c2 > c2 > c1, the regulator would like
to encourage bypass whereas the incumbent and the entrant would prefer
access. This is a situation where the regulator should optimally limit the
use of the existing infrastructure by the entrant, and force the entrant to
build his own network. Notice that, in dynamic models, third-party access
to infrastructure has been criticized on the grounds that it delays investment
in alternative and better infrastructure. In our analysis, we see that manda-
tory access to infrastructure leads to higher retail prices and that productive
efficiency is achieved at the expense of the consumers. Restricting the pos-
sibility of access may thus be valuable both from a static and dynamic point
of view.
8If the regulator cannot impose losses to the incumbent, this regulatory tool will not
be available.
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3.5.2 Access price regulation
The alternative to restricting the possibilities of access is to regulate the
access price and the access conditions under mandatory access. When the
threat of bypass is absent, access price regulation is essential to avoid mo-
nopolization or market foreclosure.9 When alternative infrastructure are
economically viable, access price regulation might be softer or eventually
removed. Indeed, the cost of implementing a fully-fledged regulation at the
wholesale level may exceed the benefit. Along this line, Peitz (2005) argues
that in a mature market, regulatory interventions should be replaced by ex-
post control by antitrust authorities. Indeed, in many countries, there is no
longer an ex-ante price regulation for wholesale services in the telecommu-
nication markets.
Suppose that the regulator is constrained and can only intervene ex-post
to modify locally the access price set by the incumbent. We observe that, in
the limit pricing re´gime, any local variation in the access price would benefit
the consumers. A slight decrease in the access price would not change the
entrant’s make-or-buy decision but it would lead to lower retail prices. A
slight increase in the access price would lead to a switch from access to
bypass by the entrant and also result in a decrease in the retail prices. In
the constrained access regime, a regulator has always incentives to intervene
ex-post to modify the wholesale market price.
4 A linear example
In this section, we illustrate the analysis of the strategic deterrence game by
looking at a linear model where demands are given by
xi(pi, pj) = 1− pi + δpj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, δ < 1. (10)
The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) is the displacement ratio which indicates how
an increase in the price of good j raises the demand of good i. We now
check that Assumption 1 is satisfied. The first part of the Assumption
requires δ < 2. The second part of the Assumption holds if and only if the
displacement ratio δ is smaller than one.
4.1 Equilibrium analysis
We first compute the price equilibrium in the access case, and find:
9See Laffont and Tirole (1994).
15
pˆa1 =
2 + 2c1(1− δ) + δ + 3δw
4− δ2 ,
pˆa2 =
2 + c1δ(1− δ) + δ + (2 + δ2)w
4− δ2 .
The demands are given by:
xˆa1 =
2 + δ − δw(1− δ2)− c1(1− δ)(2− δ2)
4− δ2 ,
xˆa2 =
2 + δ + c1δ(1− δ)− 2w(1− δ2)
4− δ2 ,
and the equilibrium profits:
pˆia1 =
[2− c1(2 + 2δ − δ2) + δ + 3wδ][2 + δ − δw(1− δ2)− c1(1− δ)(2− δ2)]
(4− δ2)2
+
[(w − c1)(4− δ2]][2 + δ + c1δ(1− δ)− 2w(1− δ2)]
(4− δ2)2 ,
pˆia2 =
(2 + δ + c1δ(1− δ)− 2w(1− δ2))2]
(4− δ2)2 .
We easily check that the two prices pa1 and p
a
2 are increasing in w, that
the profit of the incumbent is concave in w, and the profit of the entrant
decreasing in w. We compute the optimal access charge of the incumbent
as:
w∗ =
8 + δ3 + c1(1− δ)(8 + 2δ2 − δ3)
2(1− δ)(8 + δ2) .
Observe that the optimal access charge is linearly increasing in the unit cost
of the incumbent c1, and is increasing in the displacement parameter δ. For
δ = 0, when the two markets are independent, the incumbent chooses the
access charge which is equal to the wholesale price chosen by an integrated
monopolist, w∗ = 1+c2 . As δ increases, the incumbent has a higher incentive
to raise the access charge, as it also softens competition and increases profits
on the retail market. Figure 3 illustrates this monotonic relation, by plotting
the optimal access charge as a function of δ when c1 = 0.2.
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Figure 3: Optimal access charge
We now turn to the pricing equilibrium of the bypass model. We solve
the equilibrium prices as:
pˆb1 =
2 + δ + 2c1 + c2δ
4− δ2 ,
pˆb2 =
2 + δ + 2c2 + c1δ
4− δ2 .
with equilibrium quantities:
xˆb1 =
2 + δ − c1(2− δ2) + δc2
4− δ2 ,
xˆb2 =
2 + δ − c2(2− δ2) + δc1
4− δ2
and equilibrium profits:
pˆib1 =
(2 + δ − (2− δ2)c1 + δc2)2
(4− δ2)2 ,
pˆib2 =
(2 + δ − (2− δ2)c2 + δc1)2
(4− δ2)2
The limit access charge w˜(c2) can now be computed as:
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w˜ =
c2(2− δ2)− c1δ2
2(1− δ2) .
We note that the limit access charge is a linearly increasing function
of c2 and a linearly decreasing function of c1. In accordance with Lemma
2, we observe that w˜ > c2 if and only if c1 > c2. Figure 4 shows how
the limit access price w˜ varies with the displacement ratio δ both when
c2 = 0.2 > c1 = 0.1 (the upper curve) and when c1 = 0.2 > c2 = 0.1 (the
lower curve). When the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, the
limit access price increases with δ, so that one should observe higher access
charges when firms are closer substitutes. If, on the other hand, the entrant
is more efficient than the incumbent, the limit access price decreases with δ,
but this case never arises at equilibrium, as the incumbent always chooses
to accommodate bypass.
-
6
δ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
c1 < c2
c1 > c20.1
0.2
Figure 4: Limit access charge
4.2 Welfare Analysis
It is well-known that linear demand functions in a differentiated duopoly
can be generated by the quasi-linear utility function
U(x1, x2) =
∑
i=1,2
[
αxi − βx
2
i
2
]
− γx1x2 −
∑
i=1,2
pixi, (11)
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with α = 11−δ , β =
1
1−δ2 and γ =
δ
1−δ2 . We recall that the welfare function
is a weighted sum of consumers’ utilities and firm’s profits,
W = (1− λ)(α(x1 + x2)− β(x21 + x22)− γx1x2 − p1x1 − p2x2),
+ λ(p1x1 + p2x2 − c1x1 − θx2),
with θ = c1 in the case of access and θ = c2 in the case of bypass. Fixing
δ = 0.4, c1 = 0.2; we now compute the welfare function W both at the access
re´gime when w = w˜(c2) and at the bypass re´gime for different values of c2
and λ. The results are reported in Table 1.
c2 = 0.1 c2 = 0.3 c2 = 0.99
λ W a W b W a W b W a W b
0 0.1594 0.1536 0.1293 0.1339 0.0539 0.0516
0.5 0.3699 0.4011 0.3760 0.3507 0.3274 0.2404
1 0.5805 0.6436 0.6227 0.5661 0.6003 0.4292
Table 1: Welfare under access and bypass
Table 1 shows that, for low values of the entrant cost, c2 = 0.1, the pref-
erences of consumers and of the firms are opposite: consumers prefer access
whereas firms prefer bypass. When they are given equal weight in the wel-
fare function, bypass is chosen. For intermediate values of the entrant cost,
c2 = 0.3, consumers favor bypass whereas firms prefer access. With equal
weights to consumers and firms in the welfare function, access is preferred.
Finally, for very high values of the entrant cost (c2 = 0.99), the preferences
of consumers and firms are aligned, and they both prefer access.
5 Extensions
5.1 Fixed cost
In the analysis so far, we have assumed that the entrant faces no fixed en-
try cost. This assumption is unlikely to hold in some industries, like the
telecommunications industry, where firms can only enter after they invest
in a network. In the first extension, we suppose that the entrant incurs a
fixed cost f2 to enter the market. In classical models of industrial organi-
zation, fixed costs have no influence on pricing decisions but only affect the
participation decision. In our framework, this is no longer the case, as the
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fixed cost affects the limit access charge and hence the retail prices when the
incumbent chooses to deter access. Hence, higher fixed costs will ultimately
result in higher consumer prices in our model.
At the price setting stage, once fixed costs have been paid, the equilib-
rium retail prices are identical to those computed for the baseline model,
and are characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. However, at the earlier stage
of the game, the make-or-buy decision is affected by the fixed cost, as the
entrant will choose to enter as long as w ≤ w˜(c2, f2), which is implicitly
defined by:
pˆia2(w˜(c2, f2)) = pˆi
b
2(c2)− f2. (12)
Clearly, the presence of the fixed cost makes bypass less attractive, al-
lowing the incumbent to charge a higher access price to deter bypass. Hence,
the limit access charge w˜(c2, f2) is increasing in f2. Furthermore, as
∂pa1
∂w > 0
and ∂p
a
2
∂w > 0, higher fixed costs result in higher prices and lower consumer
utility in the parameter region where the incumbent chooses to deter by-
pass.10 As consequences, given that retail prices increase with the wholesale
price, consumers face higher prices when the incumbent deters bypass.
Regarding the optimal access charge, we can replicate the above argu-
ments to show that when the entrant has a higher marginal cost than the
incumbent, the incumbent either sets the minimum of the optimal access
charge w∗ and the limit access charge w˜(c2, f2). But, contrary to the previ-
ous case, when the entrant has a lower marginal cost than the incumbent,
bypass does not necessarily occur. Indeed, as the access price w˜ is higher
when f2 > 0, it is no longer true that w˜(c2, f2) < c2 when c2 < c1. Never-
theless, we can identify a fixed cost threshold such that bypass occurs when
the fixed cost is below the threshold.
Proposition 5 The incumbent sets the access charge w as follows. if c1 <
c2, w = min[w˜(c2, f2), w∗] and the entrant chooses access. If c2 < c1, define
the two threshold fixed cost levels f¯2 and f¯2 by:
w˜(c2, f¯2) = w∗,
pia1(w˜(c2, f¯2)) = pi
b
1(c2).
If f2 < min{f¯2, f¯2}, the incumbent selects bypass. If f2 ≥ min{f¯2, f¯2}, the
incumbent deters bypass either at an access charge w∗ (if f2 > f¯2) or at the
limit access charge w˜(c2, f2) (if f¯2 > f2 > f¯2).
10Notice that any fixed cost f1 incurred by the incumbent has no influence on pricing
decisions, as it is sunk before the access or bypass decision is made.
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It is instructive to compare Proposition 5 with Proposition 3. When the
incumbent is more efficient, access is chosen with or without fixed costs,
and the incumbent’s decision leads to an efficient technological choice. If
the entrant has a lower unit cost, the definition of technological efficiency
is more complex, as it depends on the total quantities supplied of the two
goods. In addition, the incumbent’s decision depends on the fixed cost level.
If the fixed cost level is sufficiently high, the incumbent can impose access
at a high level of the access charge (either w∗ or w˜(c2, f2) and will optimally
choose to impose access. If the fixed cost level is low, as in Proposition
3, the incumbent will prefer to allow bypass. A fixed infrastructure cost
for the entrant thus results in a larger parameter space for which access
occurs. As access is associated with softer competition and higher retail
prices, this induces a decrease in consumers’ utility. For this reason, when
alternative infrastructures are viable, mandatory access should be considered
with caution.
5.2 Alternative timing
In the baseline model, we assume that the incumbent can commit to the
access charge w before the entrant chooses whether to bypass the network,
and before prices are chosen. As in classical models of entry deterrence, this
assumption relies on the incumbent’s technological possibility to commit to
the access charge w. In this section, we briefly analyze the game under
alternative sequences of decisions.
5.2.1 Simultaneous moves
Consider first the simultaneous moves game where the incumbent cannot
commit to the access price w and selects instead p1 and w at the same
time as the entrant selects p2. A rapid inspection of the incumbent’s profit
under access, (equation (1)), shows that for fixed p1 and p2, the incumbent’s
profit is increasing in w. Hence, in an access re´gime, the incumbent has an
incentive to select a price w = p2 which captures all the rents that the entrant
makes on the retail market. Knowing this, the entrant never chooses to buy
access and prefers instead to build its own network. We thus obtain:
Proposition 6 In the simultaneous move game, in equilibrium, the entrant
always bypasses.
Proposition 6 is reminiscent of similar results in the entry deterrence
literature: if the incumbent cannot commit to the limit price, it cannot
21
deter entry and must accommodate the entrant. This result shows how
important the commitment technology is for the incumbent, and suggests
that the incumbent may prefer to entrust the choice to a third party (like a
regulation agency) in order to guarantee commitment.
5.2.2 Stackelberg leadership
In this extension, we modify the order of moves by assuming that the in-
cumbent behaves as a Stackelberg leader and selects the retail price p1 and
the access charge w before the entrant chooses access or bypass and its retail
price p2.11
At the last stage of the game, given p1 and w, the entrant’s profit under
access and bypass are given by:
pia2 = (p2 − w)x2(p1, p2) (13)
pib2 = (p2 − c2)x2(p1, p2) (14)
Let us define by pa∗2 (p1, w) and pb∗2 (p1), the profit maximizing price under
access and bypass respectively. Given that the incumbent sets its price
before the make-or-buy choice of the entrant, the most profitable option
is the cheapest one. Thus, the entrant bypasses if w < c2 and uses the
incumbent’s network otherwise. The bypass deterrent price w˜ is thus equal
to the entrant’s marginal cost c2.
Anticipating the entrant’s behavior, the incumbent’s profit is given by
pia1 = (p1 − c1)x1(p1, pa∗2 ) + (w − c1)x2(p1, pa∗2 ) if w ≤ c2
pib1 = (p1 − c1)x1(p1, pb∗2 ) if w > c2
The incumbent chooses the price pair (p1, w) that maximizes its profit. We
can identify three candidate equilibria:
1. (pa∗∗1 , w∗∗) defined as the unconstrained maximizers of pia1 ,
2. (pa∗1 , c2) where pa∗1 is defined as the maximizer of pia1 when w = c2,
3. (pb∗1 , w > c2) where pb∗1 is defined as the maximizer of pib1.
Comparing the three candidate equilibrium, the optimal access charge
is given by:
11Bloch and Gautier (2008) consider a similar timing for the case of regulated retail and
wholesale prices for the incumbent.
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Proposition 7 The incumbent sets the access charge w as follows: If c2 <
c1, bypass occurs. If c1 ≤ c2 < w∗∗, the incumbent sets the limit access
charge w˜ = c2 to deter bypass. If c2 ≥ w∗∗, the incumbent sets the optimal
access charge w∗∗ and deters bypass.
With this alternative timing, the incumbent commits to its wholesale
and retail price. Thus, for any given retail price p1 that will be applied
in both re´gimes, the entrant chooses the cheapest option for production:
bypass if c2 < w and access otherwise. The bypass deterrent price is thus
equal to the entrant’s marginal cost c2. This price applies as long as the
incumbent is more cost effective than the entrant and the bypass deterrent
price is lower than w∗∗.
6 Concluding remarks
In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service
using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure
capacity (bypass). In this paper, we analyze a game played by an incumbent
and an entrant, where the incumbent selects the access charge optimally,
taking into account the subsequent decision of the entrant. By analogy with
strategic entry deterrence, we show that there exist three re´gimes: one where
the incumbent accommodates bypass, one where the incumbent blocks by-
pass by choosing the optimal access charge, and one where the incumbent
selects a limit access price to deter bypass. Interestingly, the optimal choice
of the unregulated incumbent leads to a technologically efficient situation,
where the most efficient firm produces the network good. However, produc-
tion efficiency is realized at the expense of allocative efficiency, and retail
prices are too high. By preventing access and encouraging bypass, the regu-
lator could increase social welfare. In two extensions of the model, we show
that the characterization of the three re´gimes is robust to the introduction
of a fixed cost of entry, that commitment is essential to deter bypass, and
that the incumbent would benefit from a first mover advantage.
Our analysis provides an exhaustive picture of the behavior of an un-
regulated incumbent in a network industry, showing the tension between
allocative and productive efficiency when alternative infrastructures are vi-
able but not necessarily more efficient. In this case, competition (or potential
competition) between technologies at the wholesale stage does not suppress
the need for regulation. We did not consider a ’first best’ regulation that
would control both the access price and the make-or-buy choice made by
the entrant because such a regulation is informationally demanding as it
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requires to know the costs of both the entrant and the incumbent. We
rather consider ’second-best’ regulation where the regulator either controls
the make-or-buy choice by making access provision mandatory or not or has
the ability to intervene ex-post to modify locally the access price. These two
limited instruments prove to be useful to reduce retail prices and sometimes
to increase the welfare.
Regulation of access is still at the heart of a quite vivid debate in the
telecommunication industry where access regulation should promote retail
competition and investments in next generation network. Our results par-
ticularly emphases on the consequences on retail prices of promoting access
to existing infrastructure but we left aside the question of optimal regulatory
policy.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For any p2, let φ1(p2) denote the unique solution
to equation (5) and for any p1, let φ2(p1) denote the unique solution to
equation (6). We construct the function φ : [0, p]2 → [0, p]2 as φ(p1, p2) =
(φ1(p2), φ2(p1)). The function φ is increasing and hence, it admits a fixed
point by Tarski’s theorem. It is easy to check that any fixed point of the
function φ is a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.
In addition, we check that 1 > φ′1(p2) > 0 and 1 > φ′2(p1) > 0, guar-
anteeing that the fixed point is unique. In order to compute ∂pˆ
a
1
∂w and
∂pˆa2
∂w ,
we differentiate the first order conditions (5) and (6) with respect to w to
obtain:
∂2pia1
∂p21
∂p1
∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
∂p2
∂w
= −∂x2
∂p1
,
∂2pia2
∂p1∂p2
∂p1
∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p22
∂p2
∂w
=
∂x2
∂p2
.
Solving the system of linear equations,
∂p1
∂w
=
−∂x2∂p1
∂2pia1
∂p21
− ∂x2∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
D
,
∂p2
∂w
=
∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p21
+ ∂x2∂p1
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
D
,
where
D =
∂2pia1
∂p21
∂2pia2
∂p22
− ∂
2pia1
∂p1∂p2
∂2pia2
∂p1∂p2
> 0.
We immediately check that ∂p1∂w > 0 and
∂p2
∂w > 0. Now, observe that
∂pia2
∂w
=
∂pia2
∂p1
∂p1
∂w
− x2.
Replacing x2 using the first order condition (6), and noting that
∂pia2
∂p1
=
(p2 − w)∂x2∂p1 ,
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∂pia2
∂w
= (p2 − w)(∂x2
∂p1
∂p1
∂w
+
∂x2
∂p2
).
The first term in this expression is the strategic effect which is always posi-
tive: An increase in w increases p1, enabling the entrant to charge a higher
price p2. The second term is the direct effect which is always negative:
An increase in w reduces the entrant’s profit margin. We show that under
assumption 1, the direct effect dominates the strategic effect. We write:
sign
∂pia2
∂w
= sign
∂x2
∂p1
−∂x2∂p1
∂2pia1
∂p21
− ∂x2∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p21
∂2pia2
∂p22
− ∂2pia1∂p1∂p2
∂2pia2
∂p1∂p2
+
∂x2
∂p2
.
Hence, to prove that ∂pi
a
2
∂w < 0, it suffices to show that:
−(∂x2
∂p1
)2
∂2pia1
∂p21
− ∂x2
∂p1
∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
+
∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p21
∂2pia2
∂p22
− ∂x2
∂p2
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
∂2pia2
∂p1∂p2
< 0.
which is the second condition in Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: By the envelope theorem, we compute
dpia1
dw
=
∂pia1
∂p2
∂p2
∂w
+ x2.
Differentiating once more with respect to w:
d2pia1
dw2
=
∂p2
∂w
[
∂2pia1
∂p2∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p22
∂p2
∂w
+
∂2pia1
∂p2∂p1
∂p1
∂w
]
+
∂2p2
∂w2
∂pia1
∂p2
+
∂x2
∂p1
∂p1
∂w
+
∂x2
∂p2
∂p2
∂w
< 0
Finally, note that
∂pia1
∂w
|c1 = (p1 − c1)
∂x1
∂p2
+ x2 > 0,
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so that the optimal access charge is always higher than c1. (Note that we
do not rule out the fact that the profit function is always increasing in w,
so that the optimal access charge is w = p, resulting in no production for
the entrant.)
Proof of Proposition 2: The argument is standard and hence omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix the marginal cost of firm 2 at x and consider the
following profit functions:
pih1 = (p1 − c1)x1(p1, p2) + β(x− c1)x2(p1, p2),
pih2 = (p2 − x)x2(p1, p2).
If β = 1, this system corresponds to the profit functions under access ; if
β = 0, it corresponds to bypass. Under Assumption 1, we can check that
∂2pih1
∂p21
< − ∂2pih1∂p1∂p2 < 0,
∂2pih2
∂p22
< − ∂2pih1∂p1∂p2 < 0
Next compute the first order conditions characterizing the equilibrium prices:
x1(p1, p2) +
∂x1
∂p1
(p1 − c1) + β∂x2
∂p1
(x− c1) = 0, (15)
x2(p1, p2) +
∂x2
∂p2
(p2 − x) = 0. (16)
By a standard computation,
∂p1
∂β
=
−∂x2∂p1 (x− c1)
∂2pia1
∂p22
E
,
∂p2
∂β
=
∂x2
∂p1
(x− c1) ∂
2pia1
∂p1∂p2
E
,
where
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E =
∂2pih1
∂p21
∂2pih2
∂p22
− ∂
2pih1
∂p1∂p2
∂2pih2
∂p1∂p2
> 0.
Hence, if x < c1, ∂p1∂β < 0 and
∂p2
∂β < 0 ; if x > c1,
∂p1
∂β > 0 and
∂p2
∂β > 0 and
if x = c1, ∂p1∂β =
∂p2
∂β = 0
Next note that
∂pih1
∂β
=
∂pih1
∂p2
∂p2
∂β
+ (x− c1)x2,
= (p1 − c)∂x1
∂p2
∂p2
∂β
+ β(x1 − c)∂x2
∂p2
∂p2
∂β
+ (x− c1)x2,
∂pih2
∂β
=
∂pih2
∂p1
∂p1
∂β
,
= (p2 − x)∂x2
∂p1
∂p1
∂β
.
Suppose first that x < c1. Then, ∂p1∂β < 0 and
∂p1
∂β < 0. As x < p2 and
∂x2
∂p1
> 0, we immediately obtain ∂pi
h
2
∂β < 0, so that pi
a
2(x) < pi
b
2(x). Now notice
that
(x1 − c)∂x2
∂p2
∂p2
∂β
= β
∂x2
∂p2
(x− c1)2∂x2
∂p1
∂2pia1
∂p1∂p2
1
E
,
< 0.
so that,
∂pih1
∂β
< (p1 − c)∂x1
∂p2
∂p2
∂β
+ (x− c1)x2,
< 0.
where the last inequality is obtained because ∂p2∂β < 0,
∂x1
∂p2
> 0 and x < c1.
Hence, pia1(x) < pi
b
1(x).
Next, suppose that w∗ > x > c1, so that ∂p1∂β > 0 and
∂p1
∂β > 0. We
immediately obtain: ∂p
h
2
∂β > 0 so that pi
a
2(x) > pi
b
2(x). Next note that, as pi
a
1
is concave and x < w∗, ∂pi
a
1
∂w > 0, and
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∂pia1
∂w
=
∂p2
∂w
((w − c1)(∂x2
∂p2
+ (p1 − c1)∂x1
∂p2
)) > 0.
By Proposition 1, ∂p2∂w > 0, so that
(w − c1)(∂x2
∂p2
+ (p1 − c1)∂x1
∂p2
) > 0,
and, as β(x− c1) < x− c1, we have that, for all x < w∗,
∂pih1
∂β
=
∂p2
∂β
((p1 − c)∂x1
∂p2
+ β(x1 − c)∂x2
∂p2
) + (x− c1)x2,
> (x− c1)x2,
> 0.
so that pia1(x) > pi
b
1(x).
Proof of Proposition 4: We first show that, under Assumption 2, ∂U∂p1 < 0
and ∂U∂p2 < 0. To this end, notice that the maximization problem of the
consumer results in the two equations:
p1 =
∂U
∂x1
,
p2 =
∂U
∂x2
,
which implicitly defines the demand functions x1(p1, p2) and x2(p1, p2). Fur-
thermore,
∂2U
∂x21
dx1
dp1
+
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
dx2
dp1
= 1,
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
dx1
dp1
+
∂2U
∂x22
dx2
dp1
= 0.
so that
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∂x2
∂p1
= −
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
∂2U
∂x21
∂2U
∂x22
− ∂2U∂x1∂x2
. (17)
Next, compute
∂U
∂p1
=
∂U
∂x1
∂x1
∂p1
+
∂U
∂x2
∂x2
∂p1
− x1 + p1∂x1
∂p1
,
= p1
∂x1
∂p1
+
∂U
∂x2
∂x2
∂p1
− x1 − p1∂x1
∂p1
,
=
∂U
∂x2
∂x2∂p1 − x1,
< 0.
Where the last inequality stems from Assumption 2. A similar computation
shows that ∂U∂p2 < 0, so that any increase in prices harms consumers.
By Lemma 2, if x < c1, ∂p1∂β < 0 and
∂p2
∂β < 0. Hence, p
a
1(c2) < p
b
1(c2)
and pa2(c2) < p
b
2(c2) so that U
a(c2) > U b(c2). In addition, w˜(c2) < c2 and,
by Proposition 1, ∂p
a
1
∂w > 0 and
∂pa2
∂w > 0 so that p
a
1(w˜(c2)) < p
a
1(c2) and
pa2(w˜(c2)) < p
a
2(c2)) showing that, U
a(w˜(c2)) > Ua(c2) > U b(c2).
By the proof of Lemma 2, if x > c1, ∂p1∂β > 0 and
∂p2
∂β > 0, so that
pa1(c2) < p
b
1(c2) and p
a
2(c2) < p
b
2(c2) and U
b(c2) > Ua(c2). Suppose first that
w˜(c2) < w∗. Then, as w˜(c2) > c2, by Proposition 1, pa1(w˜(c2)) > pa1(c2) and
pa2(w˜(c2)) > p
a
2(c2)) showing that, U
a(w˜(c2)) < Ua(c2) < U b(c2).
If now w˜(c2) > w∗, then in order to deter bypass, the incumbent opti-
mally selects w = w∗, and Ua is independent of c2. If c2 < c2, U b(c2) >
Ua(w∗) and if c2 > c2, U b(c2) < Ua(w∗).
Finally, notice that, as w∗ > c1, Ua(w∗) < U b(w∗) so that c2 > w∗.
Proof of Proposition 5: As the equilibrium of the pricing game and of
the make-or-buy decision have been discussed in the text, we focus on the
incumbent’s access charge choice at the first stage of the game.
When c2 ≥ c1, the argument underlying Proposition 3 remains valid, as
pia1(x) > pi
b
1(x) and pi
a
2(x) > pi
b
2(x) − f2 for all x > c1. However, it is not
necessarily the case that pib2(x)− f2 > pia2(x) for x < c1, so that the analysis
of the case c2 < c1 needs to be modified. Define f¯2 to be the fixed cost level
such that the entrant is indifferent between access at w∗ and bypass,
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w˜(c2, f¯2) = w∗,
and f¯2 the fixed cost level at which the incumbent is indifferent between
bypass and access:
pia1(w˜(c2, f¯2)) = pi
b
1(c2).
If f2 < min{f¯2, f¯2}, then w˜(c2, f¯2) < w∗ and the incumbent must select
an access charge w˜(c2, f2) to deter bypass, but deterring bypass is not prof-
itable as pia1(w˜(c2, f¯2)) < pi
b
1(c2). Hence, bypass will be chosen. On the other
hand, if f2 ≥ min{f¯2, f¯2}, two cases arise. If f2 > f¯2, the incumbent can
deter access by choosing the optimal access charge w∗, which by a simple
revealed preference argument, must result in a higher profit than bypass. If
f¯2 > f2 > f¯2, the incumbent deters bypass by selecting a limit access charge
w˜(c2, f2) which results in a higher profit than bypass.
When c2 < c1, the incumbent has the choice between the limit access
charge w˜(c2, f2) or bypass. From equation (12), it is immediate that, for a
given c2, a higher fixed cost leads to a higher w˜. Furthermore, we know that
w˜(c2, 0) < c2. Furthermore, let us define by f¯2, the fixed cost value such
that the limit access charge is equal to w∗: pia2(w∗) = pib2(c2) − f¯2 and we
recall that w∗ > c1 (Lemma 1).
When the fixed cost is such that w˜(c2, f2) ≤ c2 < c1, the incumbent is
strictly better off allowing bypass. When the fixed cost is such that w˜ ≥ c1,
the incumbent is better of preventing bypass since (1) the opportunity cost of
access is non-negative (w˜(c2, f2) ≥ c1) and (2) the entrant is less aggressive
at the price setting stage (w˜(c2, f2) > c2). By continuity, there exists a
threshold value for the fixed cost such that, for the corresponding wholesale
price level, the incumbent is indifferent between deterred bypass and allowed
bypass.
Proof of Proposition 6: In the text.
Proof of Proposition 7: We first show that, given p1 and w, the entrant
chooses access if w ≤ c2 and bypass otherwise. The profit of the entrant
can be expressed as pi2 = (p2 − x)x2(p1, p2), where x = c2 if the entrant
bypasses and x = w if the entrant buys access. Given that p1 is already
given at the second stage of the game, we observe by the envelope theorem
that ∂pi2∂x < 0. Hence, the entrant selects the cheapest input price, and will
bypass if c2 < w and buy access otherwise.
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In order to deter bypass, the incumbent must price access at or below the
entrant’s marginal cost. As long as c2 is smaller than w∗∗, it is the optimal
limit access price is w = c2. This strategy dominates accommodating bypass
if and only if c2 ≥ c1. Finally, if c2 > w∗∗, the incumbent can deter bypass
by selecting the optimal access charge w∗∗.
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